Poverty Measures and Anti-Poverty Policy with an Egalitarian Constraint by Subramanian, S.
 
Copyright    UNU-WIDER 2004 
* Madras Institute of Development Studies, Tamil Nadu, India; email: subbu@mids.ac.in 
This study has been prepared within the UNU-WIDER project on ‘New Directions in Development 
Economics’, which is directed by Tony Addison. 
UNU-WIDER acknowledges the financial contributions to the research programme by the governments 
of Denmark (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Finland (Ministry for Foreign Affairs), Norway (Royal 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Sweden (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency—Sida) 
and the United Kingdom (Department for International Development). 
ISSN 1810-2611 ISBN 92-9190-591-7 (internet version) 
Research Paper No. 2004/12 
Poverty Measures and Anti-Poverty 




Bourguignon and Fields (‘Poverty Measures and Anti-Poverty Policy’) and 
Gangopadhyay and Subramanian (‘Optimal Budgetary Intervention in Poverty 
Alleviation Schemes’) have derived optimal budgetary rules for the redress of poverty 
through direct income transfers when poverty is measured by the Foster, Greer and 
Thorbecke Pα  class of indices in the context of a constrained optimization exercise 
which one may call the ‘canonical problem’. For the stock of poverty measures most 
commonly in use, the canonical problem yields one of only three types of optimal 
solution which Bourguignon and Fields call, respectively, a ‘type-r’, a ‘type-p’ and a 
‘mixed-type’ policy. The authors suggest that other types of policy—such as a 
‘proportionality rule’ in which the budget is allocated in proportion to a poor person’s 
share in the aggregate poverty deficit—could be considered optimal in certain 
circumstances. This paper explores the sorts of circumstances—meaning combinations 
of poverty indices and different types of ‘egalitarian’ restrictions on optimal transfers—
under which ‘unconventional’ policies (including the Proportionality Rule) could 
emerge as optimal budgetary allocations. 
Keywords: poverty, transfer schedules, income-gap ratios 
JEL classification: I32, I38, D63  
The World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) was 
established by the United Nations University (UNU) as its first research and 
training centre and started work in Helsinki, Finland in 1985. The Institute 
undertakes applied research and policy analysis on structural changes 
affecting the developing and transitional economies, provides a forum for the 
advocacy of policies leading to robust, equitable and environmentally 
sustainable growth, and promotes capacity strengthening and training in the 
field of economic and social policy making. Work is carried out by staff 
researchers and visiting scholars in Helsinki and through networks of 
collaborating scholars and institutions around the world. 
www.wider.unu.edu publications@wider.unu.edu 
 
UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) 
Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, Finland 
 
Camera-ready typescript prepared by Liisa Roponen at UNU-WIDER 
Printed at UNU-WIDER, Helsinki 
 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s). Publication does not imply 
endorsement by the Institute or the United Nations University, nor by the programme/project sponsors, of 
any of the views expressed. 
Acknowledgements 
A first draft of this paper was written in the course of a Visiting Fellowship at UNU-
WIDER over April-June 2003. It has benefited from discussions with Arunava Sen and 
D. Jayaraj, and from audience responses during a seminar presented at UNU-WIDER. 








When poverty is sought to be alleviated through direct income transfers, and assuming 
perfect knowledge regarding the personal distribution of incomes, the question arises as 
to how best to allocate a budget of given size among competing contenders for it from 
among the poor population. This problem has been considered by, among others, 
Bourguignon and Fields (1990)—hereafter BF—and Gangopadhyay and Subramanian 
(1992)—hereafter GS. The optimal solution, as might be expected, would depend on the 
precise way in which one measures poverty, and also on the constraints that constitute 
part of the optimization exercise. Both BF and GS consider the Foster, Greer and 
Thorbecke (1984)—hereafter FGT—Pα  family of poverty indices, while BF, 
additionally, consider Sen’s (1976) poverty index as well. The constrained optimization 
problem addressed by both sets of authors is what one might call the canonical problem. 
In the canonical problem, poverty is sought to be minimized, by appropriate choice of 
an income-transfer schedule, subject to a budget constraint, and a floor (non-negativity) 
and a ceiling (poverty-gap) constraint on the transfers. The principal objective of this 
paper is to analyse a slight complication of the canonical problem by allowing for a 
tighter constraint structure through the specification of certain egalitarian restrictions on 
the income-transfers. 
For the canonical problem considered by BF and GS, and given the stock of poverty 
indices most commonly in use, the optimal transfer schedule assumes one or other of 
three forms which BF call, respectively, a ‘type-r’ policy, a ‘type-p’ policy and a 
‘mixed-type’ policy. A ‘type-r’ policy is a ‘type of anti-poverty policy that transfers all 
of the available budget to the richest of the poor…’ (BF 1990: 413). A ‘type-p’ policy is 
one which ‘does the opposite. Only the poorest of the poor receive a transfer, which 
brings them all up to the same income level, still below the poverty line…’ (BF 1990: 
414). A ‘mixed-type’ policy is one which requires the allocation of ‘a (strictly positive) 
fraction of the money to the poorest of the poor’ (BF 1990: 416). 
The BF paper ends on a note of presenting an interesting problem for further research. 
The authors point out that, under certain circumstances, one may wish the optimal anti-
poverty policy to be different from every one of the type-r, type-p and mixed-type 
allocations. A plausible optimal solution, for example, is an allocation in which each 
poor person receives a share of the budget in proportion to the shortfall of the person’s 
income from the poverty line. These sorts of optimal solutions would presumably be 
called forth by optimization problems that go beyond the canonical problem and which 
entail the additional postulation of certain ‘equality-preferring’ constraints. This paper 
considers a few such ‘expanded’ problems and the corresponding solutions for the FGT 
class of poverty indices. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents preliminary formalities of 
concepts and definitions. Section 3 briefly reviews the canonical problem and its 
solution for the FGT family of poverty measures. Section 4 discusses transfer schedules 
different from ‘type-r’, ‘type-p’ and ‘mixed-type’ schedules which might have a 
measure of prima facie plausibility attached to them. Sections 5 and 6 analyse the 
solutions for the FGT poverty indices in the context of two ‘expanded’ versions of the 
canonical problem, incorporating certain additional ‘egalitarian’ constraints. Section 7 
presents a simple numerical example to elucidate the results of the preceding sections. 
Concluding observations are offered in section 8. 2 
2  Basic concepts  
For every positive integer n, let X
n be the set {x∈ S
n xi ≤  xi+1, i = 1,…,n-1}, where S
n is 
the non-negative orthant of n-dimensional real space. Every x belonging to X ≡  ∪ n=1
∞ X
n 
is then a description of an n-person ordered distribution of (non-negative) incomes. The 
poverty line, which is a positive level of income such that any person whose income is 
below this level is certified to be poor, is designated by z. T will stand for the set of 
positive, and S for the set of non-negative, reals. The set of poor persons is 
Q ≡  {i xi < z}. The cardinality of Q will be denoted by q. A poverty index is a mapping 
P:XxT  →   S such that, for every regime (x;z) of income-distribution and positive 
poverty line, P assigns a real number which is intended to signify the extent of poverty 
in the regime (x;z). Two commonly invoked desirable properties of poverty indices are 
the following (see Sen 1976 and Foster 1984): 
Monotonicity (Axiom M). Other things equal, an increase in a poor person’s income 
should reduce poverty. 
Transfer (Axiom T). Other things equal, a rank-preserving transfer of income from a 
poor person to a poorer person should reduce poverty. 
For every (x;z) in the domain of the poverty function, the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke, or 
Pα , class of poverty measures, is given by: 
(2.1) Pα (x;z) = (1/n)Σ i=1
q[(z-xi)/z]
α , α  ≥  0. 
When α  = 0, we obtain the headcount ratio H ≡  q/n. When α  = 1, we obtain the per 
capita income-gap ratio R ≡  HI, where I ≡  (z-µ
P)/z is the income-gap ratio and µ
P is the 
average income of the poor. When α  = 2, we obtain the ‘distributionally sensitive’ 
poverty index given by P2 = H[I
2 + (1 – I)
2C
2] where C
2 is the squared coefficient of 
variation in the distribution of poor incomes. As α  becomes larger and larger,   
Pα  becomes more and more distributionally sensitive until, in the limit, as α  →  ∞ ,  
Pα  converges on a sort of Rawlsian ‘maximin’ measure, in terms of which the poverty 
ranking of distributions is determined solely by the income of the poorest person. 
It may be noted that the Pα  family of indices belongs to the class of ‘additively 
separable poverty measures’ (see Atkinson 1987 and Keen 1992): each index P in this 
class can be written as a simple average of the ‘deprivation functions’ φ (xi;z) of all 
individuals, where φ  displays the property that φ (xi;z) > 0 for xi < z and φ (xi;z) = 0 for  
xi ≥  z. For the Pα  family of indices, the relevant deprivation functions φ α  are given by 
φ α (xi;z) = [(z – xi)/z]
α  ∀ i∈ Q, α  ≥  0 
             = 0 ∀ i∉ Q 
If we plot φ α  against income, it can be checked that φ α  is a constant function of income 
over the range [0,z) when α  = 0; φ α  is a declining, strictly concave function for α∈  (0,1); 
φ α  is a declining linear function for α  = 1; and φ α  is a declining, strictly convex function 
for α  > 1. As is well known, the poverty index P satisfies Axiom M whenever φ  is 
strictly declining, and P satisfies Axiom T whenever φ  is declining and strictly convex. 
Thus, P0 violates both Monotonicity and Transfer; for α∈  (0,1), Pα   satisfies 3 
Monotonicity but violates Transfer—in fact it rewards regressive transfers among the 
poor; P1  satisfies Monotonicity but fails Transfer (it is invariant with respect to 
interpersonal redistributuions of income among the poor); and for α  > 1, Pα  satisfies 
both Axioms M and T. These features of the members of the Pα  family of measures are 
reflected in the corresponding optimal anti-poverty transfer schedules associated with 
them, as will be seen in the following section. 
3  The canonical problem and its solution for the Pα  indices 
The ‘canonical’ or ‘standard’ way in which the constrained poverty-minimization 
problem is formulated, and which will be called ‘problem 1’, is set out below, in the 
specific context of the Pα  class of poverty indices. In what follows, T is the budget 
available for transfers to the poor, and it is assumed that z ≤  T < D, where 
D ≡  Σ i=1
q(z – xi) is the aggregate poverty deficit, namely the total income that would be 
required to extricate the entire poor population from poverty. The lower bound on T 
indicates that the budget is always large enough to lift at least one ‘completely’ (i.e., 
zero-income) poor person out of poverty: this is purely an assumption of convenience, 
designed to avoid clutter in the subsequent presentation of optimal solutions. The upper 
bound on T—the requirement that T < D—is to keep the problem of poverty-redress 
non-trivial. It will also throughout be assumed that an incremental rupee allocated to the 
poor which does not reduce poverty in terms of the chosen poverty measure will not be 
spent on the poor: that incremental rupee is more efficiently spent on other competing 
claims such as infrastructure, or import-substitution, or whatever. 
Problem 1 
Minimize Pα (x1 + t1,…,xq + tq) = (1/n)Σ i=1
q[(z – xi – ti)/z]




qti ≤  T 
(B) ti ≤  z – xi ∀ i = 1,…,q 
(C) ti ≥  0 ∀ i = 1,…,q 
Constraint A is a simple feasibility constraint which says that the sum of transfers to the 
poor should not exceed the budgetary outlay available. Constraint B imposes a measure 
of ‘efficiency’ on the individual transfers, by requiring that no resources should be 
wasted on any individual by allocating to her a transfer in excess of her poverty gap. 
Constraint C is a non-negativity constraint which says that no poor person may be taxed. 
The solutions to problem 1 for the Pα   class of indices, in each of four cases 
(α  = 0, α∈  (0,1), α  = 1, and α  > 1), are provided below. These are essentially the results 
presented in BF (1990) and GS (1992), and will therefore not be proved here. In what 
follows, s will stand for the smallest integer such that Σ i=s
q(z – xi) ≤  T, and b will stand 
for the largest integer such that xb ≤  x*, where x* is that level of income which satisfies 
Σ i=1
b(x* – xi) = T. For parametric variation of α  in the Pα  family of poverty measures, 
the corresponding optimal transfer schedules {ti*}i∈ Q look like this:  4 
α  = 0 
ti* = 0 ∀ i = 1,…,s – 1 
     = z – xi ∀ i = s,…,q 
α∈  (0,1) 
ti* = 0 ∀ i = 1,…,s – 2 
     = T – Σ i=s
q(z – xi) for i = s – 1 
     = z – xi ∀ i = s,…,q 
α  = 1 
If B is the set of all allocations which exhaust the budget while satisfying the non-
negativity constraint, then every {ti}i∈ Q∈ B is optimal. That is to say, any feasible 
transfer schedule which exhausts the budget is also optimal. 
α  > 1 
ti* = x*-xi ∀ i = 1,…,b 
     = 0 ∀ i = b + 1,…,q 
As can be seen from the above, the solutions for α  = 0 and α∈  (0,1) are what BF refer 
to as a ‘type-r’ policy, which is essentially a ‘top-down’ stratagem of ‘skimming off the 
surface’. It may be noted that s could be such that Σ i=s
q(z – xi) < T: since P0 does not 
satisfy Axiom M, there would be no point in allocating any part of the unutilized budget 
to the remaining (q  –  s) poor persons. However, for α∈  (0,1), Pα   does satisfy 
Monotonicity; arising from this, the optimal transfer schedule must exhaust the budget 
(see GS, 1992), which is why the quantity [T – Σ i=s
q(z – xi)] is allocated to individual  
s – 1. By way of stressing a minor difference, we may wish to call the solution for α  = 0 
a ‘type-r’ policy, and the solution for α∈  (0,1) a ‘type-r+’ policy. (Of course, if s were 
such that Σ i=s
q(z – xi) = T, then the solutions for α  = 0 and α∈  (0,1) would be identical: 
r would coincide with r+). When α  = 1, one has an infinite number of solutions of which 
‘type-r’, ‘type-p’ and ‘mixed-type’ policies are all special cases: this is not a particularly 
helpful guide to policy. Finally, for α  > 0, the optimal policy is a ‘type-p’ one, in terms 
of which the beneficiaries are the poorest of the poor, all of whom are brought up to a 
common level of income (x*) below the poverty line. This solution implements a sort of 
‘lexicographic maximin’ principle. 
The next section briefly considers possible anti-poverty policies which are different 
from ‘type-r’, ‘type-p’ and ‘mixed-type’ policies. 
 5 
4 Alternative  plausible  anti-poverty policies  
BF (1990) conclude their paper on the following note: 
Following the argument in this paper, an alternative approach to the axiomatics 
of poverty would be to start from assumptions about the optimal allocation of an 
anti-poverty budget. Usual measures all lead to optimal allocations of type-p, 
type-r or mixed. But one may consider that another type of allocation should be 
optimal in some circumstances. For instance, the budget T could be optimally 
transferred to every one proportionally to his/her poverty shortfall [(z – xi)]. The 
problem would then be to characterize all poverty measures consistent with such 
optimal allocations and some other basic axioms. 
Let us call a ‘proportionality rule’ of the type described by BF as a ‘PR-type’ policy. 
Are there other rules, outside the ‘type-p’, ‘type-r’ and ‘mixed-type’ rules, which have 
at least a measure of plausibility, at first glance, attached to them? Here are a couple of 
such rules. One type of policy may be based on the notion that the only meaningful 
redress of the condition of poverty is to actually lift a person out of poverty, and further, 
that the greatest urgency attaches to raising the poorest of the poor to the poverty line: 
such a policy will be called a ‘type-b’ policy, to signify that it entails a ‘bottom-up’ 
approach to poverty alleviation. A second type of policy may be premised on the view 
that all poor persons have an equal claim on any incremental budgetary resource that 
may be available for distribution among them: such an ‘equal division’ policy could be 
called a ‘type-e’ policy.  
Notice that a type-e policy is ‘egalitarian’ only to the extent that it prohibits the poorer 
of two poor individuals from receiving a smaller share of the budget. Indeed, if E is the 
class of all such ‘weakly egalitarian’ solutions—namely solutions which demand that 
the poorer of two poor persons should never receive a smaller share of the budget—then 
it is clear that type-b, type-p, PR-type and type-e policies all belong to this class. Indeed, 
these solutions occupy decreasingly ‘pro-poorest-of-the-poor’ positions in a spectrum of 
‘egalitarian’ policies which is bounded on the ‘right’ by the type-e policy. As we 
proceed from a type-b policy to a type-e policy, we move in a direction which is less 
and less influenced by a concern for rectifying the existing structure of inequality in 
determining optimal budgetary intervention.  
A type-b policy so strongly favours the poorest of the poor that it ends up, arguably, 
overcompensating in their behalf, by requiring the budgetary allocation to be such that 
in the post-transfer regime the poorest of the poor actually overtake their initially more 
fortunate cohorts. This has the appearance of amounting less to a rectification of 
inequality than to a retribution for it. Type-p, which we have seen is based on a 
lexicographic maximin principle, is less extreme; even so, ‘Rawls-type’ rules have 
sometimes been criticized for insisting on a stringent form of egalitarianism, whereby 
‘the dictatorship of the weakest/poorest’ is upheld. The PR-type policy clearly adopts a 
more (respectively, less) relaxed stance in asserting the claims of the poorer among the 
poor than type-p (respectively, type-e). Type-e itself, as we have seen, defers to the 
interests of the most disadvantaged only to the extent that it disallows the less poor of 
two poor persons from obtaining a larger share of the budget. Of course, once solutions 
of the type-r variety are considered, it is transparent that the boundary of the class E of 
solutions has been transgressed, and one is dealing with solutions which are plainly 
inegalitarian. 6 
When the canonical problem is addressed, the only anti-poverty policy belonging to the 
class E of ‘weakly egalitarian’ policies which is known to have emerged as a solution, is 
the type-p rule. To obtain other egalitarian solutions of the types (‘b’, ‘PR’, and ‘e’) 
considered in the immediately preceding paragraphs, the canonical problem must 
presumably be expanded by placing some additional ‘equality-preferring’ restrictions on 
the optimal transfer schedule. After all, the policy maker’s ‘values’ are reflected not 
only in the objective function (in this case the poverty measure) of the optimization 
problem, but also in the way in which s/he chooses to specify the constraints under 
which the extremization exercise is carried out. In the canonical problem—see the 
specification of problem 1 in section 3—it is true that Constraint A is not much more 
than a requirement of sanity; but Constraints B and C are not in this sense value-neutral. 
Constraint B expresses a preference for an ‘efficient’ or ‘unwasteful’ use of resources, 
while Constraint C expresses a value regarding the political/ethical unsustainability of 
taxing the poor. It would thus appear to be unexceptionable to add to the constraints of 
the canonical problem, to make these reflect, for example, a preference for allocational 
outcomes which lean in the direction of favouring the poorer among the poor. Of course, 
any such constraint should be stated in such a way that, in a non-trivial sense, it falls 
short of actually explicitly stipulating a unique outcome. Two such constraints are 
presented below. 
First, some notation. For every i∈ Q, let di ≡  (z – xi) be person i’s shortfall from the 
poverty line. For all j,k∈ Q, define the index of pairwise inequality, σ j,k, as the share of 
j’s income-gap in the combined income-gaps of both j and k, namely σ j,k ≡  dj/(dj + dk). 
Clearly, σ j,k ≥  ½ if dj ≥  dk, and σ j,k < ½ if dj < dk. Finally, for all j,k∈ Q, let σ ′j,k be the 
value of σ j,k  after the transfer has been effected. Two ‘egalitarian’ constraints, in 
addition to the constraints embodied in the canonical problem, which could be 
considered are Constraints D and D′, as specified below. 
Constraint D. For all j,k∈ Q, if xj ≤  xk, then tj ≥  tk. 
Constraint D simply states that the poorer of two poor persons should not get a smaller 
share of the budget. 
Constraint D′. For all j,k∈ Q, if σ j,k ≥  ½, then σ ′j,k ≤  σ j,k. 
According to Constraint D′, the optimal transfer schedule should respect the 
requirement that for the poorer of two poor persons, the index of pairwise inequality σ j,k 
should not worsen. 
By adding Constraints D and D′ respectively to the canonical problem (or problem 1), 
we obtain a couple of expanded versions of the standard optimization exercise, which 
can be called ‘problem 2’ and ‘problem 3’, respectively: 
Problem 2 
Minimize Pα (x1 + t1,…,xq + tq) = (1/n)Σ i=1
q[(z – xi – ti)/z]




qti ≤  T 
(B) ti ≤  z – xi ∀ i = 1,…,q 7 
(C) ti ≥  0 ∀ i = 1,…,q 
(D) For all j,k∈ Q, if xj ≤  xk, then tj ≥  tk 
Problem 3 
Minimize Pα (x1 + t1,…,xq + tq) = (1/n)Σ i=1
q[(z – xi – ti)/z]




qti ≤  T 
(B) ti ≤  z – xi ∀ i = 1,…,q 
(C) ti ≥  0 ∀ i = 1,…,q 
(D′) For all j,k∈ Q, if σ j,k ≥  ½, then σ ′j,k ≤  σ j,k 
The optimal solutions to Problems 2 and 3, when the Pα  class of poverty indices is 
employed, are considered in Sections 5 and 6 respectively. 
5  Optimal solutions to problem 2 for the Pα  class of indices 
α  = 0 
When α  = 0, the object is to minimize the headcount ratio. Clearly, the appropriate 
stratagem cannot be one of bridging the income-gaps of the richest of the poor: since the 
index H fails the monotonicity axiom, and since the budget T is smaller than what it 
takes—namely the quantity D—to wipe out poverty, the poorer of the poor would end 
up receiving no transfer—which falls foul of Constraint D. Minimization of the 
headcount ratio would now therefore require that we start by bridging the income-gap of 
the poorest person and work our way upward until the budget is exhausted. Formally, 
the optimal allocation is of the following type. If c is the largest integer such that   
Σ i=1
c(z – xi) ≤  T, then 
ti* = z – xi ∀ i = 1,…,c 
     = 0 ∀ i = c + 1,…,q 
This, precisely, is what has earlier been alluded to as a ‘type-b’ policy.  
α∈  (0,1) 
As has been noted earlier, when α∈  (0,1), the deprivation function φ α  is a declining, 
strictly concave function of income: consequently, poverty minimization would favour 
larger allocations to the richer among the poor. Starting from the richest of the poor 
individuals—individual q—it must first be determined as to what is the largest transfer 
that can be made to q. Given Constraint D, any allocation made to q cannot be larger 
than the allocation made to q – 1, which in turn cannot be larger than the allocation 
made to q – 2, and so on down the line. Under these circumstances, it is clear that the 
largest allocation that can be made to q is T/q, provided T/q does not exceed (z – xq): 
this proviso is necessitated by respect for Constraint B. If T/q does not exceed (z – xq), 
then obviously the optimal allocation is one in which each poor person receives a 8 
transfer of T/q. If, however, T/q exceeds (z – xq), the largest amount q can receive is 
(z – xq). Turning next to individual q – 1, we compare the quantities [T – (z – xq)]/(q – 1) 
and (z – xq – 1): if the former does not exceed the latter, it would be optimal to allocate a 
transfer of [T – (z – xq)]/(q – 1) to each of the poorest q – 1 individuals; if the former 
does exceed the latter, person q – 1 should be allocated an amount of (z – xq – 1). We 
proceed with this sequence of calculations down the line from richest (of the poor) to 
poorest individual in order to arrive at the overall optimal solution, which can be stated 
in terms of the following recursive structure of transfers: 
ti* = min[(z – xi), {(T – Σ j=i + 1
qtj*)/i}] ∀ i = 1,…,q – 1 
and 
tq* = min[(z – xq),T/q]. 
This, precisely, is what has earlier been alluded to as a ‘type-e’ policy. 
α  = 1 
As in the canonical problem, there is no unique solution for minimizing P1 in problem 2: 
the set of optimal solutions for problem 2 is a strict subset of the set of optimal solutions 
for problem 1, and consists of all feasible allocations which exhaust the budget and 
respect the requirement that a poorer individual never receives a smaller share of the 
budget than a richer poor individual. Thus, each of the type-b, type-p, PR-type and  
type-e policies—indeed, every budget-exhausting allocation in the class E of policies—
is an optimal P1–minimizing rule for problem 2. However, a type-r+ policy which is 
optimal for problem 1 is no longer so for problem 2. 
α  > 1 
It is obvious from inspection that the type-p policy is also the optimal solution for 
problem 2 when α  > 1: Constraint D has no ‘effective bite’ that might necessitate a 
deviation from a type-p policy. 
6  Optimal solutions to problem 3 for the Pα  class of indices 
α  = 0 
Mere inspection assures us that the type-b solution is again the optimal solution for 
problem 3. 
α∈  (0,1) 
Recalling the definitions of σ j,k and σ ′j,k, it is easy to verify that Constraint D′ can be 
written equivalently as: For all j,k∈ Q, if xj ≤  xk, then tj/(z – xj) ≥  tk/(z – xk). By virtue of 
strict concavity of the deprivation function φ α  for all values of α  in the interval (0,1), the 
value of the poverty index declines more, for any given income transfer, the richer is the 
beneficiary. Consistent with this would be to set tj/(z – xj) = tk/(z – xk) for all j,k such 9 
that xj ≤  xk, that is, to set ti/(z – xi) = λ  (say) for all i∈ Q, where λ  is any real number. 
Since Pα∈ (0,1)  satisfies Monotonicity, the optimal solution {ti*}must be one which 
exhausts the budget. That is, since ti*/(z – xi) = λ  for all i∈ Q, we require that   
(Σ 1
q ti* =) λΣ 1
q(z – xi) = T, or λ  = T/D, where D ≡  Σ 1
q(z – xi) is, as noted earlier, the 
aggregate poverty deficit. Stated formally, we have 
ti* = [(z-xi)/D] T ∀ i = 1,…,q 
This, precisely, is what has earlier been alluded to as a ‘PR-type’ policy—the 
proportionality rule suggested by BF. It may be noted that if Pα
0 is the value of the 
poverty index before the transfers, then its value after the budgetary intervention is very 
simply given by Pα ′ = [(D – T)/D]Pα
0. 
α  = 1 
Again, there is no unique solution for minimizing P1 in problem 3: the set of optimal 
solutions for problem 3 is a strict subset of the set of optimal solutions for problem 2, 
and consists of all feasible allocations which exhaust the budget and respect the 
requirement that a poor individual never receives a share of the budget smaller than his 
share in the aggregate poverty deficit. Thus, each of the type-b, type-p, and PR-type 
policies is an optimal P1-minimizing rule for problem 3. However, a type-e policy 
which is optimal for problem 2 is no longer so for problem 3. Briefly, if B is the set of 
optimal solutions for problem 1, B′ the set of optimal solutions for problem 2, and B″ 
the set of optimal solutions for problem 3, then B″⊂  B′ ⊂  B. 
α  > 1 
It is straightforward, again, that the type-p solution continues to remain the optimal 
solution for problem 3 too. 
7  A summary of problems and solutions, and an example 
A tabular summary, which sets out each of problems 1, 2 and 3 and the solutions to 
them for the Pα  class of poverty indices, is presented below. It provides a compact 
resume of all the relevant results discussed in sections 3, 5 and 6 (the index P1 is an 
exception, since it entails multiple solutions). To obtain a quantitative picture of the 
various allocational patterns entailed as optimal solutions to the problems we have 
considered, and to enable a view of how little or much these allocational patterns are 
weighted in favour of the poorest of the poor, a simple numerical example is also 
provided. In this example, the poverty line is taken to be Rs 50, and the budgetary 
outlay for transfers to the poor is assumed to be Rs 40. The income vector is taken to be 
represented by the three-person distribution of incomes (10,30,40). The summary table 
is completely self-explanatory, and will therefore not be elaborated on. 
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A summary of problems and solutions for the Pα  class of poverty indices,  
and a numerical example of poverty-minimizing allocations  
when {xi}i∈ Q = {10,30,40}, z = 50, and T = 40 
 







policy  t1* t2* t3*   
 
Amount of budget 
utilized 
 
1 P0  Type-r  0 20 10  30 
 P α∈ (0,1)  Type-r+  10 20 10  40 
 P α  > 1  Type-p 30  10  0  40 
  
2 P0  Type-b  40 0 0  40 
 P α∈ (0,1)  Type-e  15 15 10  40 
 P α  > 1  Type-p 30  10  0  40 
 
3 P0  Type-b  40 0 0  40 
 P α∈ (0,1)  Type-PR 22.857  11.429  5.714  40 
 P α  > 1  Type-p 30  10  0  40 
 
8 Concluding  observations 
A poverty index is generally written as a normalized weighted sum of the income-gap 
ratios of the poor; the weights are either some function of the income-gap ratios 
themselves or some function of the rank-orders of the incomes. In either case, there 
appears to be no poverty index whose minimization under the constraints embodied in 
what may be called the canonical problem yields solutions different from what 
Bourguignon and Fields (1990) have called ‘type-r’, ‘type-p’ and ‘mixed-type’ solutions. 
In as much as the values of the policy-maker are expressed both through the minimand 
and the constraint structure of the optimization exercise s/he undertakes, this paper has 
sought to derive ‘unconventional’ allocational patterns as optimal solutions to 
extensions of the canonical problem in which ‘egalitarian’ values are incorporated into 
the constraints in a non-trivial manner. These allocational patterns are different from the 
three types of optimal budgetary strategy conventionally encountered in the literature. 
Some ‘new’ budgetary policies which emerge as solutions to variants of the canonical 
problem are ones which have been called type-b, type-e, and PR-type rules. The last of 
these—proposed by Bourguignon and Fields—is a particularly useful allocational rule, 
striking, as it does, a balance between the extremes of egalitarian and inegalitarian 
outcomes as dictated, respectively, by the type-p and type-r rules. The implications of 
the new budgetary rules for the claims of the poorer among the poor have also been 
briefly explicated. The question addressed in this paper, additionally, can be seen to 
resonate with the analytical structure of kindred questions which arise in the context of 
international aid allocational problems and Talmudic ‘estate’ problems. In this sense, 
therefore, there is more to the logical exercise reviewed here than the curiosity-value of 
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